Reinvigorating State Power in the US Senate

Donald Trump’s victory in the election for the federal presidency has provoked bold claims of a sweeping political realignment in the States:

‘The recent political landscape has been shaken to its core, revealing a seismic shift that has emerged as a result of the latest elections. The transformative power of the MAGA movement has taken center stage, with an unprecedented demonstration of electoral prowess across the nation. What transpired is nothing short of a political paradigm shift that could redefine American politics for generations to come.’¹

If this sounds familiar to anyone, he is not imagining things.  We heard nearly the exact same claims 20 years ago when George W. Bush defeated John Kerry in the presidential election, which was similarly touted as ‘the most important election in the history of the US.’  For example, a fellow with the American Enterprise Institute, in his analysis of the Bush victory, wrote in 2005:

‘The fact that the Democratic Party seems both unwilling to accept any change in the big government programs of the New Deal or to compromise on what seems to be a radical secularist agenda, places it at a severe disadvantage in competing with the Republicans. Thus, the polarization of the electorate–much lamented by pundits and many in the media–has in this analysis been salutary for the Republican Party. The “bold colors” that Reagan called for when he urged the Republican Party to state its positions clearly seem to have attracted more support than they’ve lost. Although self-identified Republicans do not yet form a larger group than self-identified Democrats, they appear to have what might be called a working conservative majority of the electorate.

‘ . . . A serious recession, a major corruption scandal like Watergate, or a successful terrorist attack could result in an electoral revolt that strips the Republicans of their dominance temporarily. However, barring events of this kind, and assuming the Democrats remain captives of the left, the results of the 2004 presidential election seem consistent with a trend toward the Republican Party that has all the earmarks of the early stages of a long-term political realignment.’²

Well, an event ‘of this kind’ did happen:  The Iraq War became a quagmire, the Democrats won in the 2006 congressional mid-term elections because of dissatisfaction over that, and all of Bush’s grand promises to increase freedom at home through the privatization of Social Security, etc., dissolved into the stagnant air of the Chesapeake swamp – an atmosphere heavy with an abundance of broken promises to ‘the people.’

To the extent that Donald Trump can actualize any of the promises he has made – to secure the border, deport illegal aliens, eliminate the federal Dept of Education, and so on – we wish him the best.  But anyone who thinks this is the end of progressive/Leftist power in DC is deluded.  The Democratic Party’s wandering in the political wilderness after their ‘crushing defeat’ in 2004 lasted all of two years.  How long till the spectators of the US political circus get bored with the Trump Show and decide to change direction again?  Time will tell.

Early resistance has already been announced by the governors of Massachusetts, California, and Illinois.  We suspect that other Blue States and cities will join them, which will reinforce the reality that United States are not ‘one nation, indivisible’ but the confederation of separate nations they always have been.

Consolidation of all the States into one vast superstate governed exclusively by the federal apparatus in DC has been one of the greatest fears of the more perceptive statesmen of the US from the beginning.³  The rebellion of the Blue States against the incoming Trump regime is a tacit admission that even they agree on some level with their conclusions.

It is necessary, then, to strengthen those parts of our political system that allow the States to preserve the autonomy that is their birthright.

One of the wisest provisions of the Philadelphia charter of 1787 in this regard is the United States Senate.  The original mode of electing the senators, by the State legislatures, guaranteed that the States, acting in their capacities as independent nations (i.e., sending ambassadors to the federal city), would be able to directly influence the proceedings of the new coordinating government.  This would safeguard the States in various ways, even to the point of being able to bring the federal government to a complete end by not sending senators to DC:

Some advocates of the Constitution also made the case that this mode of choosing Senators would be a tool of self-preservation for state governments against the potential of federal power essentially annihilating them. James Wilson put it this way in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention:

“In the system before you, the Senators, sir, those tyrants that are to devour the legislatures of the states, are to be chosen by the state legislatures themselves. Need anything more be said on this subject?”

In other words – the mere existence of the federal government would depend on the state legislatures.

That’s how James Madison put it in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, “This election of one branch of the Federal, by the State Legislatures, secures an absolute dependence of the former on the latter.” [emphasis added]

Gov. Johnston of North Carolina was even more forceful with this view, “As long as the state Legislatures have it in their power not to choose the Senators,” he said, “they can put an end to the general government by refusing to choose Senators.” [emphasis added]⁴

But there was an unforeseen problem.  The appointment of ambassadors is mainly a task that has been performed by a high executive official.⁵  Alexander Hamilton, in one of his better moments, explains why:

‘The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation. He will, on this account, feel himself under stronger obligations, and more interested to investigate with care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled, and to prefer with impartiality the persons who may have the fairest pretensions to them. He will have FEWER personal attachments to gratify, than a body of men who may each be supposed to have an equal number; and will be so much the less liable to be misled by the sentiments of friendship and of affection. A single well-directed man, by a single understanding, cannot be distracted and warped by that diversity of views, feelings, and interests, which frequently distract and warp the resolutions of a collective body.’⁶

That turbulence and turmoil became a mainstay in senatorial elections in the State legislatures:

‘State legislatures often couldn’t agree on a Senate candidate. For example, one legislative chamber might favor one candidate while the other chamber favored another. The result was deadlock. Legislatures sometimes balloted for months on end while their state remained under-represented in Congress. A deadlock delayed the selection of New York’s senators in the First Congress, and the phenomenon became more and more common as time wore on. Between 1891 and 1905—a period of only 14 years—there were 45 deadlocked senatorial elections in 20 different states!

‘Deadlock often was broken by “stampeding”—last-minute election of a dark horse whom no one previously had thought to be of senatorial timber. In other words, a procedure that originally had produced Senators like Daniel Webster and Thomas Hart Benton eventually produced a bunch of non-entities.’⁷

The progressives were so successful at stoking outrage over this situation and others that by 1913 the peoples of the States were ready to make the fatal mistake of directly electing US senators by popular vote.  How fatal was it?  Statesmen North and South reveal the truth of it:

A number of leading Federalists took the position that this part of the Constitution was like a last line in the sand – a bulwark to prevent what everyone considered total tyranny – a completely consolidated system. For example, James Madison:

“When we come to the senate, its members are elected by the states in their equal and political capacity; but had the government been completely consolidated, the senate would have been chosen by the people in their individual capacity, in the same manner as the members of the other house.” [emphasis added]

That’s exactly what happened with the passage of the 17th Amendment.

Fisher Ames of Massachusetts forcefully argued that “too much provision cannot be made against a consolidation,” and explained – like Madison did above – that election of Senators by a popular vote as in the House of Representatives “would totally obliterate the federal features of the constitution.”⁸

The 17^th Amendment alone isn’t responsible for the gargantuan government that squats its fat, jiggly bottom down on top of all the States today (Lincoln’s war had a little something to do with that, as well as some other deplorable acts of the deep state – assassinations, wars, and so forth).  But it has played a big role, and thus is worthy of repeal.

But it is fairly obvious that we should not go back to election of US senators by the State legislatures.  Some new mode of election by the State governments is needed.  And from the foregoing it would seem that the best option would be to allow each State’s governor to choose both US senators.  This would result in higher quality people being chosen for the posts, and would clothe the senators more recognizably with the status of ambassadors of a sovereign State.  Giving the governor the ability to recall the senators at any time would likewise keep them from becoming too detached from their homes, from identifying too closely with the permanent bureaucratic ruling class in DC, and would keep the States as States well positioned in the federal government.

And yet, it might also be prudent to allow the State legislatures, for the sake of providing oversight over both the governors and the senators, to retain some involvement:  for instance, granting them the power to remove a US senator after appropriate hearings with a supermajority vote, three-fifths or two-thirds perhaps.

Reforms of this kind are always difficult, particularly when a large segment of the voters in the States is feeling very satisfied with the latest election results.  But change will come eventually to DC once again, just as it did after the supposed Bush realignment of 2004, and many a contented Red State, both within Dixie and without, will then be clamoring for ways to protect themselves from a Leftist regime in the federal city.  Changing the way US senators are chosen is one of those ways.

And even if that reform doesn’t happen while the current union lives, when it does break apart due to irreconcilable cultural differences or some catastrophe or another (reckless debt accumulation, a stupid new war, revived totalitarian pandemic restrictions, etc.) and new unions are formed (yes, that’s right:  when, not if), improvements like this would be ready to be implemented in the succeeding charter of a new restructured confederation, just as the constitution of the CSA written in 1861 improved on the Philadelphia charter of 1787.

Until such time, we will try our best to enjoy with the rest of y’all the showmanship of Yankee Doodle Donald.  May the Lord have mercy on us.

Notes

¹ ‘A New Political Landscape: MAGA’s Impact Marks the Dawn of a New Era!,’ https://turleytalks.com/a-new-political-landscape-magas-impact-marks-the-dawn-of-a-new-era/.

² Peter Wallison, ‘A Republican Country: Did the 2004 U.S. Election Signal a Party Realignment?,’ https://www.aei.org/articles/a-republican-country-did-the-2004-u-s-election-signal-a-party-realignment/.

³ E.g., Michael Boldin, ‘Consolidation and the Destruction of Liberty’, https://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2023/08/05/consolidation-and-the-destruction-of-liberty/.

⁴ Michael Boldin, ‘17th Amendment: How it Broke the Safeguard Against Consolidation,’ https://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2024/08/20/17th-amendment-how-it-broke-the-safeguard-against-consolidation/.

⁵ E.g., Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 69, ‘The Real Character of the Executive,’ https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-61-70.

⁶ Federalist No. 76, ‘The Appointing Power of the Executive,’ https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80.

⁷ Rob Natelson, ‘Repeal the 17th: Problems to Address,’ https://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2013/08/26/repeal-the-17th-problems-to-address/.

⁸ Boldin, ‘17th Amendment.’

Walt Garlington

Walt Garlington is a chemical engineer turned writer (and, when able, a planter). He makes his home in Louisiana and is editor of the 'Confiteri: A Southern Perspective' web site.

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